PUBLIC

UTILITIES--COMPREHENSIVE

ADJUSTMENT CLAUSE HAS

A SUFFICIENT NEXUS TO RATE PROCEEDING TO BE STATUTORILY

re Board's Investigation of Telephone Cos., 66 N.J. 476, 333 A.2d 4 (1975).
PERMISSIBLE AS AN INTERIM RATE INCREASE-In

On December 13, 1973, New Jersey's Board of Public Utility
Commissioners (the Board) entered an order' allowing New Jersey
Bell Telephone. Company (Bell) to include in its tariffs a Comprehensive Adjustment Clause (CAC) 2 in order "to provide interim
relief or adjustment based upon costs which are beyond the direct
control of the utility."'3 Pursuant to this order, Bell submitted a new

tariff sheet for the Board's approval. Included in these new tariffs
were sums calculated on the basis of the CAC. 4 On December 20,
5
1973, the Board issued an order accepting the new tariffs.
Rate counsel, the representative of the public interest in these
Re Adjustment Clause In Tel. Rate Schedules, 3 P.U.R.4th 298 (N.J. Bd. Pub. Util.
Comm'nrs 1973).
2 This is the first time such a clause has been before New Jersey courts and it is
probably the first time such a clause has been used in this country. In re Board's Investigation of Tel. Cos., 66 N.J. 476, 479 n.2, 333 A.2d 4, 6 (1975).
The CAC utilizes four separate categories of expenses to determine periodic adjustments:
(1) Salaries and wages, including fringe benefits.
(2) Depreciation expense.
(3) Other expenses, a catch-all classification.
(4) Taxes including federal income taxes, real-estate taxes, revenue taxes, and
social security taxes (which have been segregated from fringe benefits).
Re Adjustment Clause In Tel. Rate Schedules, 3 P.U.R.4th 298, 302 (N.J. Bd. Pub. Util.
Comm'nrs 1973).
Although recognition was given to the validation and adoption of the CAC in New
Jersey, the Illinois Commerce Commission recently rejected the proposal to adopt a similar
clause in the rates of Illinois Bell. Order at 1, 4, 9, Illinois Bell Tel. Co., No. 58916 (Ill.
Commerce Comm'n, Feb. 26, 1975). In rendering its opinion, the Commission felt that in
adopting an automatic adjustment clause it would be abrogating its public responsibility to
have open hearings before any "significant action" was taken by the utilities. Id. at 4.
'Re Adjustment Clause In Tel. Rate Schedules, 3 P.U.R.4th 298, 299 (N.J. Pub. Util.
Comm'n 1973). The clause was discussed by the Board at an earlier stage of the proceeding.
Order of Public Utilities Commission at 4-5. In re N.J. Bell Tel. Co., No. 722-153 (N.J. Bd. Pub.
Util. Comm'nrs, Dec. 29, 1972). The adoption of a CAC was at least partially in response to a
proposal made by the Executive Director of the Board. Remarks of Dr. Arthur A. Schoenwald,
Executive Director, New Jersey Board of Public Utility Commissioners, before the Utility
Section of the New Jersey Bar Association, Dec. 7, 1972. The concept of the adjustment clause
has even received support from parties who oppose the clause's operation in practice, as a
theoretical means of compensating for inflation. See Backman & Kirsten, Comprehensive Adjustment Clausefor Telephone Companies, PUB. UTIL. FORT., March 28, 1974, at 24-26. Kirsten served
as rate counsel during the proceedings at which time the CAC was approved. See In re Board's
Investigation of Tel. Cos., 66 N.J. 476, 478, 333 A.2d 4, 5 (1975).
" Order Accepting Tariff Revisions at 2, In re Board's Investigaton of Tel. Cos., No.
732-134 (N.J. Bd. Pub. Util. Comm'nrs, Dec. 20, 1973).
5 Id.
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matters, 6 had participated both in the proceedings which led up to
the order adopting the CAC and in prior related proceedings
7
before the Board in which Bell had petitioned for rate increases.
Subsequent to the Board's acceptance of the new tariffs, rate counsel moved for rehearing and reargument before the Board on the
matter of the CAC.8 This motion was denied. 9 Rate counsel then
appealed the Board's decision to the appellate division,'0 contending that the Board lacked the power to adopt the CAC and that the
clause was therefore illegal."
While the appeal was pending in the appellate division, the
Supreme Court of New Jersey certified the matter on its own
motion, 12 and in In re Board's Investigation of Telephone Cos. 13 upheld
the validity of the CAC,' 4 finding it to be a statutorily permissible
interim rate increase.' 5 Justice Pashman filed a single dissent in
which he argued that, since there was no formal rate case pending, 1 6 the adoption of the CAC could not represent interim relief
as provided for by statute,' 7 and without requisite notice, full
6 Traditionally, the public interest in rate matters was represented by rate counsel
appointed by the Attorney General. Law of Dec. 5, 1951, ch. 357, § 1, [1951] N.J. Laws
1474, as amended, Law of Dec. 12, 1962, ch. 198, § 18 [1962] N.J. Laws 929 (codified at N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 48:2-31.1 (1969)). These powers have been recently transferred to the Department of Public Advocate, Division of Rate Counsel. See N.J. STAT. ANN §§ 52:27E-17 to
-20 (Supp. 1975-76).
7 See Order of Public Utilities Commission at 1-2, In re N.J. Bell Tel. Co., No. 722-153
(N.J. Bd. Pub. Util. Comm'nrs, Dec. 29, 1972).
s Motion for Rehearing, Reargument and Reconsideration of Decision and Order
Entered herein on Dec. 13, 1973, In re Board's Investigation of Tel. Cos., No. 732-134 (N.J. Bd.
Pub. Util. Comm'nrs, Dec. 20, 1973).
' Letter from Ralph C. Caprio, Secretary, Board of Public Utility Commissioners to
William E. McGlynn, Dec. 27, 1973 (denying motion of rate counsel).
10 In re Board's Investigation of Tel. Cos., 66 N.J. 476, 479, 333 A.2d 4, 6 (1975).
" Brief for Appellant at 12-16, In re Board's Investigation of Tel. Cos., 66 N.J. 476, 333
A.2d 4 (1975).
11 In re Board's Investigation of Tel. Cos., 66 N.J. 476, 479, 333 A.2d 4, 6 (1975). N.J.R.
2:12-1 allows the supreme court to certify any action for appeal on its own motion.
13 66 N.J. 476, 333 A.2d 4 (1975).
14 Id. at 496, 333 A.2d at 15.
15 Id. at 495, 333 A.2d at 14.
16 Id. at 499-500, 333 A.2d at 17 (Pashman, J., dissenting).
11 Id. at 501, 333 A.2d at 18. Justice Pashman viewed N.J. STAT. ANN. § 48:2-21.1
(1969) as allowing the Board to grant interim relief only in connection with future rate
proceedings. 66 N.J. at 502, 333 A.2d at 18. Although recognizing that the statute is not
completely clear, Justice Pashman interpreted the interim relief provision of N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 48:2-21.1 (1969) as suggesting
that the Legislature contemplated that the PUC would be able to grant interim
relief in connection with rate petitions soon to befiled or temporarily out of the Board's
jurisdiction much as the courts grant temporary restraining orders and emergent
relief.
66 N.J. at 502, 333 A.2d at 18 (emphasis added).
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hearing, and findings of fact, the Board's adoption of the CAC
would be outside of its delegated authority.1 8
The essential controversy presented in this case centered on
two interrelated issues: (1) whether the CAC represents a permanent rate increase within the contemplation of section 48:2-21 of
the New Jersey statutes or an interim rate increase within the
contemplation of section 48:2-21.1; and (2) if the CAC is an interim increase, how far the court is willing to go to find the
requisite nexus which ties the interim increase to the full rate
case.

19

The Board is a statutory creature 20 designed to supervise and
regulate 21 the public utilities 2 2 of New Jersey. In performing that
23
function, it is the Board's duty to set "just and reasonable" rates
to be charged by utilities providing services within the state.2 4
Coincident with its power to set rates, the Board also has the power
to increase rates already established.2 5
The statutory authority to fix rates is found in Title 48 of the
New Jersey statutes. 2 1 Section 48:2-21 allows the Board to fix rates
66 N.J. at 498, 333 A.2d at 16.
See text accompanying notes 98-106 infra.
20 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 48:2-1 et seq. (1969), as amended, (Supp. 1975-76).
21 Id. § 48:2-13 (Supp. 1975-76).
22 Id. The statute defines a "public utility" as follows:
The term "public utility" shall include every individual, copartnership, association, corporation or joint stock company . . . that now or hereafter may own,
operate, manage or control within this State any railroad, street railway, traction
railway, autobus, charter bus operation, special bus operation, canal, express, subway, pipeline, gas, electric light, heat, power, water, oil, sewer, solid waste collection,
solid waste disposal, telephone or telegraph system, plant or equipment for public
use, under privilege granted or hereafter to be granted by this State or by any
political subdivision thereof.
'9

Id.
23 Id. § 42:2-21(b) (1969) provides in pertinent part: "The board may after hearing,
upon notice, by order in writing . . . [f]ix just and reasonable . . . rates."
214Id. § 48:2-21(a) provides in pertinent part:
The board may require every public utility to file with it complete schedules of
[rates] . . . charged or exacted by it for any product supplied or service rendered
within this State ....
25 Id. § 48:2-21(d) provides in pertinent part:
When any public utility shall increase any existing individual rates . . . the
board . . . shall have power after hearing, upon notice, by order in writng to
determine whether the increase . . . is just and reasonable. . . . The board shall
approve the increase ... upon being satisfied that the same is just and reasonable.
26 Id. § 48:2-21 gives the basic authority to the Board to regulate utility rates. See, e.g.,
Public Serv. Coordinated Transp. v. State, 5 N.J. 196, 215, 74 A.2d 580, 589 (1950).
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 48:2-21.1 (1969) gives the Board the power to adjust rates. The
statute provides:
The board may, during the pendency of any hearing instituted by it, on its own
initiative or on petition, in which the approval or fixing of just and reasonable

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 6:551

after public notice and hearing and after the Board has made a full
examination of the value of the company's property (the rate base),
the company's income and expenses, and the resultant rate of
return which the company receives. 2 7 Once the rate of return has
been ascertained, the Board applies to that rate the statutory standard of just and reasonable. 28 If by that standard the rate of return
is found to be deficient or excessive, the Board may then make the
appropriate rate adjustment so as to comply with the just and
29
reasonable standard.
Section 48:2-21.1 provides a mechanism for the Board to set
adjusted interim rates through negotiation and agreement with the
individual rates, joint rates, tolls, charges or schedules thereof, as well as commutation, mileage or other special rates is in issue, or at any other time, negotiate and
agree with any public utility for an adjustment of the individual rates, joint rates,
tolls, charges or schedules thereof, as well as commutation, mileage or other special
rates for any product or service supplied or rendered by such public utility. Such
adjustment may be for, or without, a specified limit of time. In no event shall any
such adjustment be regarded as contractual. Such adjustment shall at all times be
subject to change through the proceedings provided for by this chapter, or through
negotiation and agreement under this section. The board as a part of any such
negotiation and adjustment shall provide for the continuance, suspension or other
disposition of any hearing of the character aforesaid then pending.
This provision has consistently been interpreted as granting the Board the power to fix rates
on an interim basis. See, e.g., In re N.J. Power & Light Co., 15 N.J. 82, 93-94, 104 A.2d 1, 7
(1954).
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 48:2-21.2 (1969) is a provision of limited application, which outlines
the situations in which the Board need not determine a rate base before ascertaining the
justness and reasonableness of a particular rate. See, e.g., In re Proposed Increased Intrastate
Indus. Sand Rates, 125 N.J. Super. 48, 50-51, 308 A.2d 370, 372 (App. Div. 1973), aff'd, 66
N.J. 12, 327 A.2d 427 (1974).
21 See Public Serv. Coordinated Transp. v. State, 5 N.J. 196, 216, 74 A.2d 580, 590
(1950). The court noted:
The justness and reasonableness of a particular rate of fare can only be
determined after an examination of a company's property valuation which constitutes its rate base . . . and the rate of return developed by relating its income to the
rate base.
Id.
2s See, e.g., In re N.J. Power & Light Co., 9 N.J. 498, 508, 89 A.2d 26, 30 (1952); Central
R.R. of N.J. V. Department of Pub. Util., 7 N.J. 247, 260, 81 A.2d 162, 168 (1951). The
standard of reasonableness which has been adopted in this state seeks to protect both
consumer and company. In re N.J. Power & Light Co., 9 N.J. 498, 508, 89 A.2d 26, 30
(1952). A reasonable rate
can never be more than the reasonable worth of the service supplied; neither can it
be fixed so low as to be confiscatory. If within these limits and supported by
competent evidence, rates set by the Board would clearly be just and reasonable.
Public Serv. Coordinated Transp. v. State, 5 N.J. 196, 225, 74 A.2d 580, 595 (1950). See
generally J. BONBRIGHT, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC UTILITY RATES 147-58 (1961) [hereinafter
cited as BONBRIGHT].
29 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 48:2-21(d) (1969) (conferring power on the Board, on either
complaint or the Board's own initiative to determine reasonableness). If the Board determines that the utility has received excessive revenues, it may order that refunds be made. In
re Board's Investigation of Tel. Cos., 66 N.J. 476, 492, 333 A.2d 4, 13 (1975).
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utility.3 0 This section of the statute is a complement to the normal
rate making procedure 3' and gives the Board the power to grant
increases in order to prevent the loss of just earnings which might
result between the time of filing the petition and the allowance
adjustment by the Board-the problem of "regulatory lag."' 32 The
judicial interpretation of these two sections firmly establishes the
principle that section 48:2-21.1 can only function when the adjustment can be related to a rate base and rate of return determined in a proper proceeding under the authority of section
33
48:2-21.
Pursuant to this statutory scheme, the Board heard the petition of Bell for an increase in certain of its rates. 3 4 After a full rate
case during which a voluminous record was compiled, the Board
decided to separate the proceedings into two phases. 25 In Phase I,
the Board determined that: (1) Bell's rate base had a fair value of
$1,511,348,000;36 (2) a fair rate of return for Bell would be 8.15%
30

N.J. STAT. ANN. § 48:2-21.1 (1969). The text of this section is set forth in note 27 supra.

32

See In re N.J. Power & Light Co., 15 N.J. 82, 96; 104 A.2d 1, 9 (1954).
Both courts and commentators have been aware of the problem of "regulatory lag"

which has been described as
the loss of proper earnings claimed by the utility between the time that a petition
for a rate increase is filed and the rate relief actually becomes effective by administrative or judicial determination.
State v. New Jersey Bell Tel. Co., 30 N.J. 16, 28, 152 A.2d 35, 42 (1959). The concept of
"regulatory lag" has been the basis for justifying escalator clauses generally. See Trigg,Ecalator
Clauses in Public Utility Rate Schedules, 106 U. PA. L. REV. 964, 967 (1958).
Regulatory lag is one of three factors which erode a utility's rate of return. Inflation and
attrition are the others. Wirth, Attrition, PUB. UTIL. FORT., May 24, 1973, at 15.
11 See In re Proposed Increased Intrastate Indus. Sand Rates, 66 N.J. 12, 25. 327 A.2d
427, 434 (1974).
31 See Order of Public Utilities Commission at 2, In re N.J. Bell Tel. Co., No. 722-153
(N.J. Bd. Pub. Util. Comm'nrs, Dec. 29, 1972).
31 Id. at 4.
36 Id. The concept of "rate base," which is the starting point of all rate regulation, is a
term that is at best elusive and at worst hopelessly confusing to both experts and newcomers
to the field of rate regulation. In its simplest terms the rate base is the value of the
company's property. See, e.g., In re N.J. Power & Light Co., 9 N.J. 498, 508, 89 A.2d 26, 30
(1952). But the simple definition of rate base belies its complexity:
[T]he rate base.., is the fair value of the property of the public utility that is used and
useful in the public service at the time of its employment therein and is determined by
viewing the plant as an integraland unitary whole, considering all the elements properly
entering into the ascertainment of a reasonable return for supplying the public need.
Id. at 509, 89 A.2d at 31 (emphasis added). See also Public Serv. Coordinated Transp. v.
State, 5 N.J. 196, 217, 74 A.2d 580, 591 (1950).
One commentator has noted that the concept of the rate base has been "the most widely
disputed legal issue in the history of American public utility regulation." BONBRIGHT, supra
note 28, at 159. The generally accepted standard for the rate base is the true cost of the
company's plant and equipment with "'reasonable'" amounts for interest and "working
capital." Id.
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applied to the rate base; 37 (3) at the time of the rate proceeding,
the rate of return for Bell, based on pro forma operating income,
was 6.37% and therefore not a fair rate of return; 38 and (4) Bell
should submit a new tariff schedule which would produce an
added $55,215,000 in operating income so as to give Bell the fair
39
return of 8.15% on its rate base.
In anticipation of Phase II, the Board included the following
announcement of its plan to incorporate the CAC into Bell's rate
structure:
In recognition of economic conditions and the resultant
financial straits into which utilities have been forced, the Board
proposes to initiate a comprehensive adjustment clause. This
clause will be designed to make rate regulation more re.-ponsive
to the financial needs of a utility, which is required to provide
safe, adequate, and proper levels of customer service.4"
The Board indicated that all notice requirements would be met
before the CAC was adopted. The Board also made clear that the
proceedings which were to follow were simply an extension of the
41
main rate case.
The Board anticipated that the adjustment clause would provide relief to the utility of a type more closely related to operating
costs and, therefore, more reflective of actual needs. The Board's
opinion was that such relief was preferable to the addition of a
fixed dollar amount of relief to the utility's rate at its inception to
provide for future needs. 4 2 In addition, the CAC is more closely
tied to fixed operating cost factors. Therefore, it provides for
gradual increases and obviates the need for a full-blown rate case
each time such determinate operating cost increase. A saving to
consumers would result since the cost of rate proceedings is ulti43
mately passed on to the customer.
" Order of Public Utilities Commission at 4, In re N.J. Bell Tel. Co., No. 722-153 (N.J.
Pub. Util. Comm'n, Dec. 29, 1972). A fair rate of return in New Jersey can only be
determined by viewing a utility's income in relation to its rate base. Public Serv. Coordinated
Transp. v. State, 5 N.J. 196, 216, 74 A.2d 580, 590 (1950). Bonbright points out that
although it is a generally accepted proposition that regulated utilities are entitled to a
reasonable return on their investment, the criteria for judging a fair return is one of the
most debated subjects in the area of utility regulation. BONBRIGHT, supra note 28, at 147.
38 Order of Public Utilities Commission at 4, In re N.J. Bell Tel. Co., No. 722-153 (N.J.
Pub. Util. Comm'n, Dec. 29, 1972).
39 Id.at 5.
40 Id.
41 Id.
42 Id.

43 Id. The Board's opinion reflected the views of its Executive Director when he first
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In February 1973, the Board-ordered the commencement of
an investigation into the feasibility of including the CAC in the
tariffs of the state's telephone companies.4 4 After a public hearing
on the matter, the Board issued the order adopting the CAC. It is
this order which forms the gravamen of the instant case. 45 The
Board, however, did not make the CAC automatic in its application
to company rates. In order for Bell to qualify for adoption of the
CAC, it had to file detailed financial data with the Board. The data
would have to justify the use of the CAC and would give the Board
the ability to judge the necessity for, and fairness of, the use of the
46
CAC in future tariffs.
The Board's extensive requirements are important for two
reasons. First, they serve as an indication of the Board's intention
to keep a close check on the manner in which the CAC is applied
by the companies. Second, they demonstrate the Board's intention
to treat the operation of the CAC as a part of an ongoing proceeding.
Although the statute gives the Board the power to fix rates,
the legislature has not prescribed any specific procedure which
must be followed by the Board. The courts of this state have filled
this gap by a series of important decisions. 47 The seminal decision
recommended the adoption of the CAC. Remarks of Dr. Arthur A. Schoenwald, Executive
Director, New Jersey Board of Public Utilities Commissioners, before the Utility Section of
the New Jersey Bar Association, Dec. 7, 1972. It is important to note that since the CAC, in
theory at least, would reduce the number of rate proceedings before the Board, it would
held to alleviate one of the Board's main problems--the "numerous and repetitive rate
cases." Id.
"" Order Initiating Investigation, In re Board's Investigation of Tel. Cos., No. 732-134
(N.J. Bd. Pub. Util. Comm'nrs, Feb. 15, 1973).
11 Re Adjustment Clause In Tel. Rate Schedules, 3 P.U.R.4th 298, 299, 307-08 (N.J. Bd.
Pub. Util. Comm'nrs 1973).
'6 Id. at 308. The plan devised by the Board would force the company both to justify
the rate adjustments and to provide a device which the Board could use to continually
monitor the adjustments allowed under the CAC.
The Board's plan would require the company to: (1) submit proof of an independent
audit of its corporate books; (2) present a detailed calculation showing the effect that each
CAC expense category would have on the company's total expenses and rate of return; (3)
file supplemental tariff statements with the Board, including adjustments allowed by the
CAC, detailed calculations as to the effect of the adjustment on the company's income, and
such other information as the Board might require; (4) give notice statewide through
newspaper publication prior to the incorporation of the CAC into the company's rates; and
(5) file financial statements with the Board on a quarterly basis showing separately the
adjustments and other factors bearing on the rate of return calculations. Id.
", See In re Board's Investigation of Tel. Cos., 66 N.J. 476, 333 A.2d 4 (1975); In re
Proposed Increased Intrastate Indus. Sand Rates, 66 N.J. 12, 237 A.2d 427 (1974); State v.
NewJersey Bell Tel. Co., 30 N.J. 16, 152 A.2d 35 (1959), In re NJ. Power & Light Co., 15 N.J.
82,104 A.2d 1 (1954); In re N.J. Power & Light Co., 9 N.J. 498,89 A.2d 26 (1952); Central R.R.
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in this area was O'Brien v. Board of Public Utility Commissioners.4 8 The
Board, in separate orders, had raised the fare charged to passengers of a railway company from five to seven cents and fixed a
charge of one cent on all initial transfers issued to passengers.4 9
The increase was intended to compensate the company for increased labor costs resulting from an order of the war labor
board.5 0 A citizen challenged the orders on the ground that the
Board was without jurisdiction to raise rates because it had failed to
make an essential finding of fact-the rate base.5 1 The court upheld the Board's action as being within the purview of the utility
act's negotiation and agreement section, a provision similar in import and operation to the interim relief provision of the present
statute.5 2 The court contrasted the agreement section with what it

described as "proceedings adverse to the 'public utility,' " which
necessarily results in costly drawn-out litigation. 53 Thus, instead of

requiring a full-blown rate case, the court opted for a method geared
to the exigencies of emergency situations which would be
prompt and comparatively satisfactory, and resulting, if not always in abstract justice, yet in a determination, which in the
54
hands of fair-minded men, is likely to be acquiesced in.

Although the approach adopted by the O'Brien court is significant as any early judicial recognition of the problem of "regulatory lag," 55 the factual context which prompted the court to
adopt this approach holds the key to the significance of O'Brien.
The circumstances which required the railway to seek the increase

were beyond the utility's control.5 6 The increase simply permitted
the utility to make up the expense imposed upon it by order of the
of N.J. v. Department of Pub. Util., 7 N.J. 247, 81 A.2d 162 (1951); Public Serv. Coordinated Transp. v. State, 5 N.J. 196, 74 A.2d 580 (1950); Atlantic City Sewerage Co. v. Board
of Pub. Util. Comm'rs, 128 N.J.L. 359, 26 A.2d 71 (Sup. Ct. 1942), aff'd, 129 N.J.L. 401, 29
A.2d 850 (Ct. Err. & App. 1943); O'Brien v. Board of Pub. Util. Commrs, 92 N.J.L. 44, 105
A. 132 (Sup. Ct. 1918), aff'd, 92 N.J.L. 587, 106 A. 414 (Ct. Err. & App. 1919).
48 92 N.J.L. 44, 105 A. 132 (Sup. Ct. 1918), aff'd, 92 N.J.L. 587, 106 A. 414 (Ct. Err. &
App. 1919).
49 92 N.J.L. at 45, 105 A. at 133.
11 Id. at 47, 105 A. at 133.
51 Id. at 46, 105 A. at 133.
52 Id. at 46, 53, 105 A. at 133, 136. The statute involved in this case contained provisions
similar to the present statutory scheme. Compare N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 48:2-21 to -21.1 (1970)
with Law of April 21, 1911, ch. 195, §§ 16-17, [1911] N.J. Laws 374, 376-80.
53 92 N.J.L. at 46, 105 A. at 133.
54 Id. at 47, 105 A. at 133.
5 See note 32 supra and accompanying text.
5 See 92 N.J.L. at 48, 105 A. at 134.
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war labor board.5 7 Such an increase or adjustment to meet the
forced expenses "could not make unreasonably high what was not
58
so before.
More than 30 years after O'Brien, the Supreme Court of New
Jersey was presented with another question of the Board's power
to adjust rates in Public Service CoordinatedTransport Co. v. State. 59 In
that case, the utility filed a petition with the Board seeking an
increase in its fares in order to offset an anticipated wage increase
precipitated by an arbitration award. 6 ' Although hearings were
held before the Board, "it was made clear that the companies were
not undertaking a full-fledged rate case. '6 ' The utility relied on the
O'Brien holding as support for the Board's authority to give the
utilities emergency relief inthe form of a rate increase "without the
necessity of redeterming the rate base." 6 2 The Board allowed the

increase to go into effect on an experimental basis. 63 However, the
adjusted fares subsequently produced a far greater increase in
revenues than was anticipated at the time the order was entered
and more than was needed to offset the effects of the wage increases.64 Since the Board had retained jurisdiction over the increased rates, it issued an order to the company to show cause why
the rates should not be reduced. 65 Instead of attempting to justify
the increase on the basis of the arbitration award and consequent
increase in operating costs, the company attempted to show that
the additional revenues represented simply "a fair return on a
proper rate base. '6 6 The companies were thus trying to use the
O'Brien approach to avoid a full rate case. Despite the changed
nature of the case before it, the Board determined that the fares
57

Id.

5 Id. at 50, 105 A. at 135.
59

5 N.J. 196, 74 A.2d 580 (1950).

60 Id. at 202, 74 A.2d at 583.
61 Id.
62 Id. at 203, 74 A.2d at 583. The court recognized the perimeters within which the

O'Brien approach must be confined:
To proceed on this theory necessarily required the Board to assume and the
companies to admit that the existing rate was fair and reasonable, prior to the wage
increase, and supported by an adequate rate base.
Id. at 203, 74 A.2d at 583.
63 Id. at 204, 74 A.2d at 584.
64 Id.
65 Id.

66 Id. at 205, 74 A.2d at 584. The original increase was designed to offset only the

increased costs of labor. The court, however, found that the fare increase would produce an
annual excess in revenues of $700,000 more than was actually needed to offset the additional costs. Id. at 204, 74 A.2d at 584.
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were just and reasonable and produced no more than a fair return
on the rate base.6 7 The court, however, was disturbed by the fact
that the Board had accepted the company's financial data without
question to support its findings. 6 8 For this reason, the court rejected the Board's determination on the ground that the Board
69
had failed to adequately determine a rate base.
It is important to note-that the court based its decision on the
fact that the Board had attempted to set rates as authorized by
section 48:2-21 without first determining a rate base. 70 The court
explicity dismissed the idea that its decision in any way affected the
Board's ability to adjust rates under section 48:2-21.1. However,
the court implied that the original rate adjustment to offset the
wage increase, although not directly before it in that case, was a
valid exercise of the Board's power to grant relief under the
71
negotiation and agreement statute.
Since the Public Service Coordinated Transport decision, it has
been the position of the New Jersey courts that the determination
of a rate base is necessary for any fixing of or increase in utility rate
charges.7 2 Any interim relief must be effected in connection with
67 Id. at 206, 74 A.2d at 585.
68 Id. at 218-19, 74 A.2d at 591-92. The court dearly pointed out its dissatisfaction with
the Board's basing its findings solely on the company's books:
Neither this Court nor the Board can accept the books of acount [sic] of a public
utility at face value in a rate case in which reasonableness is always the primary issue....
There must be proof in the record not only as to the amount of the various accounts
but also sufficient evidence from which the reasonableness of the accounts can be
determined.... Lacking such evidence, any determination of rates must be considered
arbitrary and unreasonable.
Id.
69 Id.

70 See id. at 214-25, 74 A.2d at 589-95.
71 In a somewhat cryptic comment with an oblique reference to O'Brien, the courtnoted:
Suffice it for us to say that nothing in our opinion in any wise limits the power
of the Board... under R. S. 48:2-21.1. That statute was not not construed by us in our
opinion. It may be pertinent, however, to observe that it was passed . . . 17 years
after the O'Brien case ....
Id. at 228, 74 A.2d at 596. This comment was contained in the per curiam opinion denying
the Petition for Rehearing. Id. at 225, 74 A.2d at 595.
The treatment here of O'Brien by the court, in dicta, has caused the court recently to
question the status of O'Brien as valid precedent. See In re Proposed Increased Intrastate
Indus. Sand Rates, 66 N.J. 12, 23, 327 A.2d 427, 433 (1974). Although the reasoning was
questioned, it does not appear that O'Brien was overruled. Courts subsequent to Public Service
Coordinated Transport have considered it valid precedent. See, e.g., Township Comm..v.
Lakewood Water Co., 54 N.J. Super. 371, 378, 148 A.2d 885,889 (App. Div. 1959): Hudson &
Manhattan R.R. v. Board of Pub. Util. Comm'rs, 16 N.J. Super. 396, 401, 84 A.2d 736, 739
(App. Div. 1951).
" See, e.g., In re Proposed Increased Intrastate Indus. Sand Rates, 66 N.J. 12, 25, 327
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an already existent rate base.7 3 The Board and the utilities have
therefore been forced to try different techniques of rate regulation
in order to meet emergency situations where rate increases were
deemed necessary. For example, a utility has attempted to increase
rates without a complete finding of a rate base by adding a surcharge to existing rates. 74 The Board has tried to utilize the interim
relief provisions of section 48:2-21.1 for the same purpose. 75 Judi76
cial examination has led to a rejection of the surcharge technique.
The courts have shown that they will scrutinize the use of section
48.2-21.1 to insure that the formal rate making procedure will not be
short-circuited by inappropriate use of the interim increase provi77
sion.
This surcharge technique was before the court in In re New
Jersey Power & Light Co.78 The Board had denied the company's
application seeking a five percent surcharge on its rates to recover
deficits incurred in prior years' operations. 79 On appeal, the supreme court affirmed the Board's denial.8 0 The court reasoned that
since the Board's statutory power allowed it "to fix 'just and reasonable ... rates,' " the addition of a surcharge to the rates (which are
already just and reasonable) would be outside of the powers granted
to the Board.8 1 The court did not, however, leave the company
without an avenue for relief. In dicta, the court pointed out that the
company could still seek "ad interim relief through negotiation and
agreement. '8 2 Speaking for the court, Chief Justice Vanderbilt
pointed the direction for utilities and the Board to take in the future.
A.2d 427, 434 (1974); Central R.R. of N.J. v. Department of Pub. Util., 7 N.J. 247, 263-64,
81 A.2d 162, 170 (1951); Hudson & Manhattan R.R. v. Board of Pub. Util. Comm'rs, 16 N.J.
Super. 396, 401-02, 84 A.2d 736, 739 (App. Div. 1951).
" In re Board's Investigation of Tel. Cos., 66 N.J. 476, 495, 333 A.2d 414 (1975).
74 In re N.J. Power & Light Co., 15 N.J. 82, 84, 104 A.2d 1, 2 (1954).
I- In re Proposed Increased Intrastate Indus. Sand Rates, 66 N.J. 12, 15, 327 A.2d 427,
428-29 (1974).
11 In re N.J. Power & Light Co., 15 N.J. 82, 97-98, 104 A.2d 1, 9 (1954).
11 See, e.g., In re Proposed Increased Intrastate Indus. Sand Rates, 66 N.J. 12, 25, 327
A.2d 427, 434 (1974).
78 15 N.J. 82, 104 A.2d 1 (1954).
71 See id. at 84, 86, 104 A.2d at 2-3. In an earlier case involving the utility the Board had
denied a requested rate increase to the company. In re N.J. Power & Light Co., 9 N.J. 498,
535-36, 89 A.2d 26, 44 (1952). At least partially as a result of this denial, the company was
forced into a deficit financial position. 15 N.J. at 85-86, 104 A.2d at 2-3. It was because of these
deficiencies that the company sought to implement the surcharge. Id. at 84, 104 A.2d at 2.
80 15 N.J. at 98, 104 A.2d at 10 (quoting from N.J. STAT. ANN. § 48:2-21(b)(1) (1969)).
81 15 NJ. at 92, 104 A.2d at 6.
82 Id. at 93, 104 A.2d at 7.
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He recognized that compliance with the statutory scheme would
prove more satisfactory than attempts to circumvent it:
These statutes taken together present a complete statutory
program of rate-making designed to produce speedy determinadons by the Board, with ad interim relief if necessary .... 83
Not until recently has the court had the opportunity to expand
on the viability of other interim relief measures under this statutory
scheme. During its current term, the Supreme Court of New Jersey,
through Chief Justice Hughes, has rendered two opinions, which set
certain guidelines within which section 48:2-21.1 will function.8 4 In
In re Proposed Increased Intrastate Industrial Sand Rates, 5 the
Board allowed a railroad to increase certain of its freight charges by
issuing "'a negotiation order' purportedly under the provisions of
[section] 48:2-21.1. '"86 Although extensive public hearings on the
increase were held, the appellate division of the superior court remanded the cause to the Board because " 'the board made no basic
findings from which it could make the ultimate finding that the new
rates were just and reasonable.' "87
On remand, the Board decided that it would be pointless to
make determinations of fact concerning the rate of return which
the increases would produce: The railroad's overall losses would
force an irrational result-a negative rate of return.8 8 The appellate court reconsidered the matter and again found the Board's
action unauthorized by statute:
[T]he Board has approved the new rates, which, admittedly, were
fixed by way of negotiation . . . on a permanent rather than on
an interim basis. Lacking such authority, the others from which
83 Id. at 96, 104 A.2d at 9. See also notes 23-26 supra and accompanying text.

'4 In re Board's Investigation of Tel. Cos. 66 N.J. 476, 333 A.2d 4 (1975); In re
Proposed Increased Intrastate Indus. Sand Rates, 66 N.J. 12, 327 A.2d 427 (1974).
85 66 N.J. 12, 237 A.2d 427 (1974).
86 Id. at 15, 327 A.2d at 428-29 (footnote omitted). For the full text of the statute see
note 26 supra.
87 66 N.J. at 15-16, 327 A.2d at 429 (quoting from the unreported opinion of the
appellate division).
88 66 N.J. at 16-17, 327 A.2d at 429-30. In its opinion, the Board noted:
"Although ... respondent will still be operating at a loss overall, and the overall
rate of return will still be a negative figure ....
the Board is of the opinion that
respondent should have the opportunity to reduce its losses in order to assist it
towards a viable reorganization for the purpose of carrying out its public service
duties."
Id. at 16, 327 A.2d 429 (quoting from Decision on Remand, No. 718-506 (N.J. Bd. Pub. Util.
Comm'nrs, Apr. 12, 1973)).
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the appeals are taken cannot be sustained under [section] 48:221.1.89

In affirming the appellate court's determination, the supreme
court discussed situations in which the negotiation statute would be

operable. 90 The court noted that under the statute interim relief
might be had by "temporarily bypassing the establishment of [a]
rate base and [a] fair rate of return," 9' but that the justification for
such rates "rests upon the legal umbilical cord which ties them to
the anticipated eventual determination of" the rate base and rate of
92

return.

This concept of a "legal umbilical cord" was extended in both
length and directional flexibility in In re Board's Investigation of
Telephone Cos., 9 3 wherein the court upheld the validity of the CAG.9 4
The court's rationale was grounded on the fact that the CAC was

adopted as a part of a two-phase rate proceeding. 95 The first
phase involved all of the conventional elements of a "rate case"
with notice and hearing and findings of fact supporting a determination of a fair rate base and rate of return. 9 6 The Board's intention to adopt the CAC was set forth at the close of Phase I, and a
simultaneous commitment to initiate Phase II was made. 97 The

standards by which the CAC's operation was to be judged were
established. The Board set up a detailed procedure for the continuing scrutiny of the CAC's operation. 98 All of these factors were
crucial in the court's consideration and final determination of the

CAC's validity:
This Court recently commented on the indispensable "legal umbilical cord" . . . . Fortuitously . . . the state of the present
litigation is such as to accommodate such a firm and unimpeachable relationship.9 9
s In re Prosposed Increased Intrastate Indus. Sand Rates, 125 N.J. Super. 48, 51, 308
A.2d 370, 372 (App. Div. 1973).
90 66 N.J. at 25-29, 327 A.2d at 434-36.
9' Id. at 25, 327 A.2d at 434 (emphasis. added).
92 Id.

93 66 N.J. 476, 333 A.2d 4 (1975).
94 Id. at 496, 333 A.2d at 15.
95 Id. at 491, 333 A.2d at 12. See notes 34-35 supra and accompanying text.
96 Order of the Public Utilities Commission at 4-5, In re N.J. Bell Tel. Co., No. 722-153

(N.J. Bd.Pub. Util. Comm'nrs, Dec. 29, 1972). See notes 36-37 supra and accompanying text.
9' Order of Public Utilities Commission at 5, In reN.J. Bell Tel. Co., No. 722-153 (N.J.
Bd. Pub. Uril. Comm'nrs, Dec. 29, 1972).
18 See notes 45-46 supra and accompanying text.
99 66 N.J. at 495, 333 A.2d at 14 (citation omitted).
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The approach which the court had taken in validating the
CAC is a unique one for two reasons. First, the standard for
judging the acceptable length of the umbilical cord is left open
except for the required periodic review by the Board. 0 0 Second,
the cord's link or merger function does not have to be prospective,
that is, it need not attach to a "rate proceeding" occurring in the
future. As the court has applied the "cord" concept to the CAC,
the linking occurs with respect to a prior and continuing rate
proceeding. This innovative approach to the problem of interim
relief adds flexibility to such devices as the CAC and can be an
important administrative tool when used to offset such regulatory
' 02
problems as "lag"'' and "attrition."'
Justice Pashman, in his dissent, voiced concern over the validity of the CAC and highlighted some of the arguments against
adoption of the clause. His primary criticism of the majority opinion was that it sanctioned an attempt "to circumvent the requirements" of the rate statute.° 3 The problem with such circumvention
is that it denies to the public the safeguards of adequate notice,
open hearing, and the satisfaction of an order of the Board sup04
ported by findings of fact.'
Another quarrel with the majority's reasoning was that the
CAC cannot be a valid technique under the authority of section
48:2-21.1. Since that section provides the public with a safeguard
that is less effective than the full-blown rate case, Justice Pashman
felt that interim relief should be "temporary and remain in force
over only a very short period of time.' t0 5 Thus, such relief can only
be had while the rate case is in progress. According to Justice
Pashman, section 21.1 should have ceased to operate when the
Board closed Phase 11.106 In addition, it was felt that the statutory
scheme required "specific 'negotiation and agreement' between the
utility and the [Board]."'0 7 That requirement, argued Justice
'0o Re Adjustment Clause In Tel. Rate Schedules, 3 P.U.R.4th 298, 307-08 (N.J. Bd.
Pub. Util. Comm'nrs 1973).
I"0 See note 32 supra and accompanying text.
102 For a discussion of attrition see generally Wirth, Attrition, PuB. UTIL. FORT., May 24,
1973, at 15. Simply defined, "attrition" is the effect which inflation has on the earnings of a
utility whose rates are set without either inflation or "lag" being adequately provided for. See
id. at 15.
103 66 N.J. at 498, 333 A.2d at 16.
104 Id.
•105Id. at 503, 333 A.2d at 19.
i06 Id. at 499-500, 333 A.2d at 17.
107 Id. at 303, 333 A.2d at 19. Justice Pashman contended that although the two phases
of the proceeding were formally joined, to consider that joinder as providing a sufficient
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Pashman, is not satisfied where the Board acquiesces in an automatic relief provision such as the CAC. Rather, the statute demands affirmative participation by the Board in every proposed rate
increase in order to safeguard the interests of the public.1 0 8
Finally, Justice Pashman was concerned with the majority's
interpretation of the phrase "at any other time" in the interim
relief provision as providing the Board with a separate basis for
granting a rate increase as an alternative to the traditional approach
requiring a case pending before the Board. 10 9 Such an alternative,
it was feared, opened the door to the possibility that the Board
could increase rates
without notice, hearings, findings of fact, or any of the other
incidents of rate making .. .essential for the protection of the

public, subject only to a vaguely defined duty to hold a full rate
proceedings every now and again ....110
As viewed by the dissent, such an open-ended approach to the
question of rate relief ignored the required nexus to a rate proceeding, with appropriate findings of fact, which the court had mandated in IndustrialSand Rates."1
basis for providing interim relief "misconstrues the function of [section] 48:2-21.1, and
exalts form over substance." Id. at 500 n.2, 333 A.2d at 17.
108 Id. at 503-04, 333 A.2d at 19. justice Pashman was also concerned that the categories
of adjustment were too broad and vague and therefore not within the spirit of "negotiation"
as required by statute. Id. at 504-05, 333 A.2d at 19-20. In order to protect the public, Justice
Pashman would, as a minimum, require the CAC to pass-through only those costs which are
"truly beyond the control of the utility" and which by "objective standards ...can be determined
with certainty." Id. at 504, 333 A.2d at 19. Further, the Justice warned:
The use of overly permissive automatic adjustment clauses enhances the risk that
utility companies will, out of laziness or greed, extract unreasonable charges from
the public. This is a problem to which we must be alert, even where, as in this case,
there is no evidence that this utility can be charged with such behavior.
Id. at 505, 333 A.2d at 20.
t09Id. at 502, 333 A.2d at 18. The actual language of the majority with which Justice
Pashman takes issue is dicta which indicates that the Board may make interim increases at
any time by agreement and negotiation. See id. at 492-93, 333 A.2d at 13. This approach
seems similar in rationale to the approach adopted in O'Brien v. Board of Pub. Util.
Comm'nrs, 92 N.J.L. 44,46-47,105 A.2d 132, 133 (Sup. Ct. 1918), aff'd, 92 N.J.L. 587,106 A.
414 (Ct. Err. & App. 1919). This reasoning was questioned by the court earlier this term. In
re Proposed Increased Intrastate Indus. Sand Rates, 66 N.J. 12, 23, 327 A.2d 427, 433 (1974)
(semble).
11066 N.J. at 502, 333 A.2d at 18.
IId. Justice Pashman's position here exhibits somewhat of an inconsistency. While
opting for a narrow reading of the statute, his argument concerning the limitation of the
duration of the adjustment fails to acknowledge the plain statutory sanction for an openended arrangement with the utility. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 48:2-21.1 (1969) provides in pertinent
part:
The board may, during the pendency of any hearing ... or at any other time,
negotiate and agree with any public utility for an adjustment of... rates ....Such
adjustment may be for, or without, a specified limit of time.
(Emphasis added).
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Although argument can be made in support of Justice
Pashman's position, the court appears to have reached a reasonable
and practical decision. By recognizing that the CAC was the result
of an open and full rate proceeding and that its operation therefore had the requisite nexus to that proceeding, the court has
provided a flexible tool which can be used by the Board to help the
utilities through periods of financial crisis. Since the Board has a
complex monitoring system' 12 on the CAC's use, the likelihood of
abuse seems rather slight.
One of the most important objections raised by Justice
Pashman, however, was that rates cannot be raised permanently
without a full rate proceeding and that this tactic was specifically
rejected by this court in Industrial Sand Rates. 1t 3 However, that case
is distinguishable from Telephone Cos. In Industrial Sand Rates, the
Board refused to find a rate base .14 In contrast, in Telephone Cos. the
Board had made a full finding as a part of the same proceeding
which
15
implemented the CAC as a measure of emergent relief.'
112 The Board's means of auditing the CAC is described in note 46 supra.
113 66 N.J. at 497-98, 333 A.2d at 16. In Industrial Sand Rates, the court explicitly

pointed out that the interim increases are still "predicated upon the justice and reasonableness, in the context of rate base, of a rate of return on its investment." Id. at 25, 327 A.2d at
434.
114 66 N.J. at 17, 327 A.2d at 430.
" See Order of Public Utilities Commission at 4-5, In re N.J. Bell Tel. Co., No. 722-153
(N.J. Bd. Pub. Util. Comm'nrs, Dec. 29, 1972) (calling for an investigation of the feasibility of the
CAC); Re Adjustment Clause In Tel. Rate Schedules, 3 P.U.R.4th 298, 299, 307-08 (N.J. Bd.
Pub. Util. Comm'nrs 1973) (Adopting the CAC).
Justice Pashman also pointed to the pact that fuel adjustment clauses, used by the
majority as analogous support for the CAC, have never been considered by the courts of
New Jersey. 66 N.J. at 505, 333 A.2d at 20. Justice Pashman indicated that in some
jurisdictions the concept of automatic adjustment clauses has been questioned on policy
grounds. Id. at 505-06 n.4, 333 A.2d at 20. For example, in Re Southern Cal. Edison Co., 94
P.U.R.3d 252, 257-58 (Cal. Pub. Util. Comm'n 1972), it was stated:
The principal arguments against Edison's fuel clause are: (1) It represents an
abdication of the commission's regulatory function; (2) it denies the ratepayer the
opportunity to participate in a public hearing and to develop a full and complete
record; (3) it has an inflationary effect on the economy; (4) frequent rate changes
would result and this is undesirable; (5) there would be no incentive for the utility
to attempt to obtain an economical supply of fuel nor to increase efficiency and
absorb all or part of fuel cost increases; (6) it ignores other rate-making factors
usually considered by the commission in spreading rates, such as competition,
characteristics of use, and public benefit; and (7) it segregates and places emphasis
on only one factor in setting rates, fuel cost, and ignores possible savings and
efficiencies that have occurred in other portions of the utility's operation.
It is important to note, as the dissent did, that despite these objections to the clause, its
validity was upheld by the Commission. Id. at 258. See 66 N.J. at 505-06 & n.4, 333 A.2d at
20 (Pashman, J., dissenting).
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The CAC might be subject to attack on at least one other basis.
Since the operation of the clause compensates Bell for attrition due
to unanticipated costs, a question arises as to whether this is not a
surcharge of the type condemned by an earlier court.' 16 However,
this attack is countered by noting that the CAC looks no more to
the past than does any other rate proceeding which of necessity
sets prospective goals on the basis of past events.'1 '
Although it is not altogether clear what impact Telephone Cos.
will have on the field of utility regulation generally,' 1 8 it does signal
a willingness on the part of the court to make the law more
responsive to the critical needs of today. The CAC gives the Board
the means to react quickly and equitably to fluctuating prices in an
unstable market. But the CAC is something more than a one-time
response to an economic stimulus. It is an answer to a recurring
regulatory problem-the Board's ability to provide immediate relief to utilities in order to counteract the effects of cost factors
beyond their control. Furthermore, it is an answer that operates
within the statutory scheme.
Glenn P. Callahan
See, e.g., In re N.J. Power & Light Co., 15 N.J. 82, 97-98, 104 A.2d 1, 9 (1954).
See Note, The Use of the Future Test Year In Utility Rate-Making, 52 B.U.L. REV. 791,
793 (1972).
118 Recently, a "cost and efficiency revenue adjustment clause" (CEAC) was rejected by
the Illinois Commerce Commission. Order at 7-9 Illinois Bell Tel. Co., No. 58916 (Il.
Commerce Comm'n, Feb. 26, 1975). See note 2 supra.
11

17

